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ABSTRACT
The three Baltic states have joined the European Union almost a decade ago, but as of yet no research 
has been carried out von how the membership in the EU has affected the national political systems 
of these countries. This article overviews the literature on how EU membership affects the relations-
hip between legislative and executive branches of government and summarizes what expectations 
could be drawn as to the character and degree of Europeanization of Baltic parliaments, based on 
the research. It also calls for an empirical study of this matter to measure these expectations against 
the reality and gives recommendations how it should be carried out. 
INTRODUCTION
Even though the Baltic States have joined the EU eight years ago, the research on the EU-related 
matters remains rather limited. So far, it has only covered a narrow range of topics, of which 
most popular are relations between the EU and the Russian Federation, Eastern Neighborhood 
Policy and its changes after the Lisbon Treaty. Research on what impact the membership in the 
EU had domestically was only limited to the field of political economy. Up to date, the questions 
how the membership in the EU has affected the political systems and legislative processes 
or how the Baltic States have adapted to the EU have not been covered. This article aims to 
provide a brief overview of the field of Europeanization research with a special emphasis on 
the literature concerning the de-parliamentization process and the EU impact on domestic 
political systems. In the two subsequent parts of this paper, the major findings in this field are 
summarized and, based on these findings, some expectations for the level of Europeanization 
and de-parliamentization in the Baltic states are presented. 1
OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The existing research on the interaction between member states and the EU can be crudely 
divided into two groups: the first group, which dominated in the field from the late 50s until 
signing the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, analyzed how national preferences are uploaded 
onto the EU level and become community legislation (Auel 2005). Since the scope and impact 
of the Community was substantially expanded by the SEA, it became impossible to ignore the 
“top- down” direction of this interaction or, in other words, how membership in the Community 
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affected national political systems. Researchers engaged in this particular matter were mostly 
interested in two things – how legislative processes in member countries are affected by the 
EU membership and what institutional changes have occurred in member states’ political 
systems due to the EU membership. The main goal of those interested in the Europeanization 
of national legislative process was to measure the reality against the expectation of Jacque 
Delors that the community-initiated legislation will account for 80% of the legislation passed 
by the parliaments in the member states (Töller 2006). Most of these investigations have found 
that in reality this number is much lower (around 40% in case of the German Bundestag) (Rau-
nio, Wiberg, 2009: 77), but at the same time their findings were brought to question due to 
unaddressed problems of operationalization and measurement. The biggest of these problems 
was, of course, defining the “Community-initiated legislation”, as legislative processes in member 
states are not only affected by the EU regulations and directives, but also by the Community’s 
“soft law”, decisions made by an open method of coordination (OMC) and resolutions of the 
European Court of Justice.  
This article mainly focuses on the second trend of Europeanization research, which analyses 
how the EU membership has affected the institutional structure of the member states, namely 
the relationship between executive and legislative branches of government. This particular 
branch of literature is very new, and yet it has witnessed very dramatic developments from 
claiming the de-parliamentization of national political systems and the overall dominance of 
the executive branch (Maurer & Wessels 2001) to announcing the re-parliamentization process 
in less than a decade (Perrson & Wiberg 2011). 
This branch of research first appeared in order to empirically test the de-parliamentization 
thesis according to which national parliaments are increasingly marginalized and the executive 
branch is continuously strengthened due to the EU membership (O’Brian & Raunio 2012: 4). 
The logic of this thesis goes like this: transfer of competences from the national to the EU level 
results in weakening the national parliaments. It occurs because the parliaments are losing their 
ability to exercise control over the spheres which they have been previously responsible for. 
The government, however, maintains and increases its influence over these matters, as they 
can influence decisions on the EU level through participating in the negotiations and voting in 
the Council. Furthermore, national parliaments often face information and resource shortages 
which seriously hinder their ability to scrutinize and control the actions of the governments. 
Finally, the continuous expansion of qualitative majority voting (QMV) to a higher number 
of spheres of the EU decision-making can possibly leave parliaments with no say over these 
policy areas at all.
Another “catch-phrase” which helped to spark interest in this kind of Europeanization 
research was the “presidentalization” thesis. According to it, participation in the EU decision-
making processes helps governments to gain more independence from the ruling coalition in 
the parliament due to a better access to information and resources dedicated to implemen-
ting the EU decisions. By limiting government’s ties with the parliament, the prime minister 
gains more room to maneuver and begins to assume more powers. By doing this, he is also 
establishing his/her independency over the rest of the cabinet and begins to resemble more 
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of a president than a traditional PM (Perrson & Wiberg 2011). Even though writings on the 
presidentalization process were poorly empirically grounded and were suffering from serious 
conceptualization problems (Perrson & Wiberg 2011), they have helped to show that the 
impact of EU membership on domestic political systems can be multi-faced and affect all the 
components of the political system. 
Despite being genuinely new and sparking a lot of interest on the matter, this early literature 
also revealed some of the major problems that continue to plague the field of Europeanization 
research to this day. First, even though everybody agrees that the Europeanization concept 
refers to the top-down interaction between the EU and the member states, there is no clear 
agreement on what exactly should be included in and what should be excluded from this 
concept. In other words, this concept still lacks a clear definition and boundaries (Radaelli, 
2000). Due to this “fuzziness” of the concept, Europeanization research has progressed only 
in narrow clearly defined sectors such as the impact of Europeanization on the relationships 
among different branches of the government (presented here). 
However, even in these isolated sectors many problems persist, namely those of the ope-
rationalization of this concept. Measuring how the power balance between the two branches 
of government has changed over the years is a tall order in itself. Trying to assess how it has 
changed due to such a multifaceted and complicated process as the EU membership is really 
difficult. This is why this branch of political science has already earned a rather bad reputation 
as suffering from continuous operationalization and reliability problems.  
Fi r s t  wa v e  o f  E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n  r e s e a r c h
All the research on this matter up-to-date can be divided into three major waves. The first 
wave sought to test the de-parliamentization thesis by looking more closely to formal insti-
tutional measures adopted by the parliaments in the member states to counteract the loss 
of competences resulting from the EU membership . The most substantial volume from this 
wave of research was a collection of essays edited by Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels 
in 2001. It was the first really inclusive comparative research about the Europeanization of 
most of the EU-15 national parliaments. This volume has analyzed what institutional changes 
have occurred in all member states since the Maastricht Treaty, what parliamentary scrutiny 
measures have been employed in the member states, and how each national parliament has 
participated in the preparation of the Amsterdam Treaty (Maurer & Wessels 2001). This focus 
of the legal aspects of Europeanization was mostly placed because of its operationalizational 
and methodological simplicity and because almost no other significant contributions had been 
made to this field before.  
The analysis revealed that very few parliaments (Austrian, Danish, and Swedish) had deve-
loped efficient measures to scrutinize their governments and thus maintain adequate levels 
of control over the EU matters (Maurer & Wessels 2001). Even though all parliaments in the 
member states had created European Affairs Comities (EACs) and were participating in the 
Conference of Parliamentary Comities for Union Affairs (COSAC), they did not have enough 
legal power, information and resources to efficiently scrutinize their governments. Furthermore, 
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parliaments seemed to be little interested in EU affairs in general and did not even use the 
leverage they had when preparing the Amsterdam Treaty. This has led the editors of this volume 
to conclude that national parliaments were “late comers and losers of European integration” 
(Maurer & Wessels 2001). Later inquiries made in this field using the same methodology basi-
cally reaffirmed the findings of the Maurer and Wessels volume (Perrson & Wiberg 2011: 201).
S e co n d  wa v e  o f  E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n  r e s e a r c h
Despite providing valuable insights on how national parliaments have reacted and adapted to 
the pressures of Europeanization, the first wave of Europeanization research did not provide a 
full understanding of how scrutiny processes are taking place on the national level. By limiting 
their focus only to the legal provisions and formal powers in the possession of national parlia-
ments rather than their actual behaviour, this wave of research failed to address the informal 
scrutiny measures adopted by the parliaments as well as the reasons why parliaments were 
often reluctant to engage in a rigorous scrutiny of their governments. 
These criticisms were addressed in part by the second wave of Europeanization research. 
This time, the focus of the research was expanded, taking into account not only formal scrutiny 
rights and measures, but also analyzing the behavioral aspects of parliamentary scrutiny, giving 
special attention to the informal measures which parliaments have adopted to scrutinize their 
governments over the EU matters. One of the most important contributions to this wave of 
Europeanization research was made by Auel & Bentz. By analyzing three European parliaments 
(British House of Commons, German Bundesrat, and Danish Folketing) which correspond to 
different parliamentary system styles (Westminster, Central European, and Nordic) and the 
opposite ends of strength of the parliamentary scrutiny spectrum (earlier developed by Maurer 
& Wessels), they have found that even though German and British parliaments have no formal 
rights to set the government’s negotiating position (mandating) in the Council of Ministers 
(as the Danish parliament has), these parliaments still have managed to develop means to 
scrutinize and control their governments (Auel & Benz 2005). The German Bundestag used 
its power mainly to issue non-binding resolutions on what position the government should 
take in the upcoming Council of Ministers negotiations. Even though these resolutions had no 
legal power, they did bind government politically to the will of the parliament. In the case of 
the British parliament, the main scrutiny measure adopted was active involvement of Britain’s 
Euro-skeptic population and media into discussions over the EU matters (Auel & Benz 2005).  
Another finding of their study was the revelation that, despite having really strong scrutiny 
powers the, Danish parliament rarely uses them to full extent. The Danish case became a perfect 
illustration of the “scrutiny dilemma” which outlines the multitude of paradoxes concerning 
parliamentary scrutiny. First, as studies have shown, in many parliaments the EU policy is 
understood as something lying inbetween domestic and foreign policy (Perrson & Wiberg 
2011). Since parliamentary involvement and discussions are welcome in the domestic policy 
areas, national solidarity and unity are required for foreign policy: naturally, often parliaments 
are inclined not to jeopardize the national unity and refrain from actively scrutinizing the go-
vernment. Second, parliaments often refrain from issuing rigid mandates to the government, 
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even if they have rights to do so, in order not to leave the government with too little space to 
maneuver in the Council negotiations. The scrutiny dilemma gets still more problematic as the 
lack of parliamentary scrutiny and the limited involvement of the parliament into the EU affairs 
can potentially have a very delegitimizing effect on the public perception of the EU. Therefore, 
a rigorous parliamentary scrutiny can prevent the Council from reaching an agreement and 
passing important legislation, while not enough scrutiny raises serious legitimacy problems 
for all EU affairs (Auel 2005).  
Finally, this wave of Europeanization research has helped to show inherent shortcomings 
of the principal- agent theory, used both to argue for the legitimacy of the whole EU affairs 
and to analyze the legislative–executive relations in the national political systems (Moravczick 
1997). According to this theory, parliaments draw their legitimacy from the fact that each of 
their members was chosen by the people to represent them. This was done, since it would be 
too complicated for the entire population to directly participate in political processes. Therefore 
the population is the principal, and members of the parliament are their agents. This process is 
repeated when the government is formed. Since the government is an agent of the parliament for 
the same reasons as parliamentarians are agents of the population, they enjoy the same degree 
of legitimacy. The EU in this theory is seen simply as a secondary tier of delegation process and 
for this reason it cannot suffer from democracy deficit as all the decisions in the EU are made by 
either direct representatives of people in the EP or by second-tier representatives in the Council. 
As for legislative-executive relations, this theory states that, since all the mandates and powers 
of the government are drawn from the parliament and the parliament has the power to replace 
poorly performing ministers or the entire cabinets, the process of de- parliamentization is not 
taking place as parliaments remain the principals of the governments (Auel 2005).
This theory pictures parliaments as unitary homogeneous actors which have coherent unified 
expectations towards the performance of the governments and control their governments 
according to these expectations. However, in the real world, such an assumption is never true 
as parliaments are always composed of at least two actors – the ruling party or coalition and 
the opposition. These actors almost always have different interests and different opinions 
regarding the performance of the government. Furthermore, they have different relations 
to the government, as the ruling party or coalition has many informal ways to approach and 
communicate with the government (via party meetings or through personal contacts), whereas 
the opposition is mostly confined to formal communication channels. Because of this situation, 
only the opposition is tempted to actively engage in formal or informal public scrutiny measures, 
as the ruling party or coalition have more efficient private channels to perform the same tasks. 
It could even be argued that all the information and resource shortages described above are 
faced only by the parliamentary opposition, whereas the ruling party faces no such shortages 
because of its links to the government (Auel 2005).    
T h i r d  wa v e  o f  E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n  r e s e a r c h
The second wave of Europeanization research addressed many of the shortcomings of how the 
impact of the EU membership on domestic political systems was understood and analyzed. By 
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shifting the research focus from legal provisions on parliamentary scrutiny rights in the member 
states to the actual behaviour of the parliaments and informal measures they employ to scruti-
nize their governments, it was shown that formal scrutiny rights account only for a small part of 
the scrutiny process and that parliaments in the analyzed EU countries are coming up with new 
innovative ways to scrutinize their governments. This mainly empirically grounded research has 
provided a serious and compelling evidence to doubt the “de-parliamentization” thesis which 
in the beginning was the stimulus that inspired Europeanization research. Furthermore, it has 
shown that national parliaments are successfully fighting back the loss of their competences 
to the EU and that instead of being “late-comers and losers of European integration” (Maurer 
& Wessels 2001) they are still very strong. Some researchers have even concluded that the 
“re-parliamentization” process is taking place in the member states (at least in the Nordic 
countries) (Perrson & Wiberg 2011).    
Upon making this conclusion and carrying out a brilliant empirically grounded work on 
how each of the member states responds to the challenges of Europeanization, attention was 
focused on explaining the two areas of Europeanization not covered by the previous research, 
i.e. on the impact of the EU soft-law (especially the open method of co-ordination (OMC)) and 
on explaining the cross-national variations in the strength of parliamentary scrutiny among 
the member states. 
The impact of the OMC
The impact of the OMC was largely ignored by previous waves of Europeanization research 
for two reasons: first, the consequences of the OMC lie somewhere between the two spheres 
of Europeanization research – Europeanization of legislative process and Europeanization of 
national political systems; therefore, the researchers that focused on only one sphere tended 
to avoid this topic. Second, as previously mentioned, all the research on the Europeanization of 
the legislative process is suffering from serious measurement problems: in case of the impact 
of the OMC, these problems tend to become even more severe, as the decisions made by the 
OMC are often made behind closed doors, and researchers tend to run into a lot of problems 
trying to acquire the needed information (Duina & Raunio 2012).  
Despite the above-mentioned problems and complications, the OMC became such an 
important feature of the Community affairs that its impact was impossible to ignore. So far, 
only a couple of research papers have been written on this topic. They all agree that the impact 
of the OMC on executive–legislative relations is multidirectional and neither strengthens nor 
weakens the national parliaments vis-à-vis governments, but rather gives a new character to 
this relationship (Raunio 2006; Duina & Raunio 2012).  
It is agreed that, on the one hand, the usage of the OMC strengthens the government as the 
EU sphere of coordination is further extended to the policy areas which previously belonged 
solely to the national parliaments. Furthermore, in all the member states, formal parliamentary 
scrutiny rights do not extend to the OMC, and parliaments have no formal means or power 
to control the government’s actions in this sphere. Finally, as mentioned before, quite often 
agreements made using the OMC are negotiated and agreed upon behind closed doors; this 
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severely limits the amount of information accessible to the public or the media. Therefore, 
national parliaments cannot use the aforementioned informal scrutiny measures, either (Duina 
& Raunio 2012). 
On the other hand, the OMC can really be beneficial for national parliaments, as it provides 
the means for all member states to share the best practices in regulating certain policy areas 
among themselves. In this regard, the OMC provides national parliaments with examples of 
how to make clear, transparent and efficient legislation without going through the tiresome 
process of coming up with such legislation themselves (Duina & Raunio 2012).
Furthermore, the OMC provides a very useful tool for national parliaments to criticize and 
control their governments. In a sense, the OMC becomes a tool to compare and evaluate each 
government’s administrative performance and, therefore, becomes a leverage for the opposition 
to criticize the government’s policies and to offer good alternatives in solving the problems of 
transparency and efficiency (Duina & Raunio 2012).
Explaining cross-national variation
Naturally, when researchers have addressed both the strength of formal and informal scrutiny 
rights in the possession of national parliaments in all the member states (at least in the EU-15), 
they have started to focus attention on explaining why the strength of parliamentary scrutiny 
varies among the member states. The most substantial work on this matter was undertaken 
by Tapio Raunio from the University of Tampere. In his research paper, utilizing the fuzzy-set-
method developed by Charles C. Ragin, he claims that this variation can be explained by a set 
of five independent variables: institutional strength of parliament, public opinion towards the 
EU, party positions regarding integration, the frequency of minority governments, and the 
political culture of the country. 
He claims that if the parliament is a strong and independent part of the national political 
system, it will be more inclined to scrutinize government actions and have more formal scrutiny 
powers. Of course, measuring the strength of institutions is very problematic, and the operatio-
nalization of this variable is rather questionable. T. Raunio, relying on the previous work done 
on this matter by Döring and Norton, measures the strength of national parliaments by their 
ability to set their agenda independently of the government and by the amount of the lobbyists 
they attract (logic here being that lobbyists are naturally attracted to power).
The second independent variable is the share of pro-European people in the general popu-
lation. T. Raunio utilizes this variable by reasoning that pro-European people are less inclined 
to protect their country’s sovereignty and are more likely to endorse the increased scope of 
the Community competences.
The third independent variable is the party position regarding integration or, more precisely, 
existence of a cleavage among the main parties in matters concerning the European Union. 
By this logic, the existence of such cleavage is likely to spark reoccurring debates in the parlia-
ment about the country’s EU policy, and scrutiny measures would be undertaken more often, 
whereas a broad consensus on European matters would grant more freedom of action to the 
government (Raunio 2005). 
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The fourth variable is the frequency of minority governments. It is agreed that the minority 
governments are often obliged to secure passing certain bills (in this case the Community-inspi-
red legislation) by building alliances with the opposition parties. It has also been demonstrated 
that such governments tend to build more stable and durable alliances on the European Union 
than on domestic policy (Perrson & Wiberg 2011). To do this, governments have to engage in 
an open parliamentary debate, to discuss and compromise on their course of action. Therefore, 
if minority governments occur frequently, parliamentary involvement and their scrutiny rights 
are strong (Perrson & Wiberg 2011). 
The final independent variable is political culture. It has been shown in the previous research 
that the share of Catholics/Orthodox in the general population strongly correlates with lenient 
attitudes towards the EU, while high percentages of (ex)Protestants indicate the Euro-skeptic 
political culture (Bergman 1997: 378). Naturally, the Euro-skeptic political culture means that 
these states are more inclined to guard their sovereignty; therefore, their parliaments would 
have stronger scrutiny rights (Raunio 2005).    
T. Raunio concludes his work by establishing that, even though all independent variables play 
important part in explaining cross-national variations, the first and the last variables are most 
important as they account for explaining about 80% of cross-national variations. Therefore, 
according to Raunio, strong parliaments and the Euro-skeptic political culture are sufficient 
reasons for a strong parliamentary scrutiny (Raunio 2005).
Naturally, since the fourth wave of Europeanization research is still in its infancy, it is really 
hard to provide a more detailed overview. Both branches of this wave (the impact of the OMC 
and attempts to explain cross-national variations) are still underresearched. Regarding the 
impact of the OMC, it is necessary to expand the existing scope of research to include as many 
different political systems as possible in order to test whether the OMC effects vary across 
different institutional designs. Furthermore, it is badly needed to expand the existing scope of 
research to include newer member states to test whether the newer members of the EU are 
affected differently.
The same applies to the attempts to explain the cross-national variation in the strength of 
parliamentary scrutiny measures. The scope of this research must be extended in order to test 
whether the same set of variables (especially the two most important ones) is applicable to 
the newer members of the EU. Since Raunio’s method to flesh out these variables is relatively 
sensitive to the number of cases, it is very likely that nearly doubling the scope of research 
would yield some new and interesting results. 
EXPECTATIONS FOR THE BALTIC STATES
The impact the EU membership had on the Baltic States’ political systems remains unresearched. 
In their study of the Nordic countries, Perrson & Wiberg conclude that Nordic parliaments have 
remained the key players in their national systems and have proven themselves to be extremely 
resilient to the processes of Europeanization and de- parliamentization. In fact, these scholars ha-
ve concluded that, contrary to earlier claims, the influence of parliaments in the Nordic countries 
is growing and that the process of re-parliamentization is taking place (Persson & Wiberg 2011). 
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The reason why such process is occurring is very simple: the Nordic countries have some of the 
oldest parliaments in Europe, and their liberal-democratic systems based on universal suffrage 
have been established very early. Since then, the parliaments have cemented themselves as the 
centres of the Nordic political systems, and this strong tradition of parliamentarism, combined 
with the institutional strength of the national parliaments, helped them to avoid losing their 
power to the executives (Persson & Wiberg 2011). In his attempt to explain the cross-national 
variation in the strength of the parliamentary system, Raunio provides also some insights into 
the strength of Nordic parliaments. Apart from the aforementioned institutional strength of 
national parliaments, the Nordic countries have rather a high share of Euro-skeptic population 
and, even though no clear and deep cleavage regarding the European Union exists in the Nordic 
party systems, these countries also have all the remaining attributes to keep the legislative power 
over the executive one. All these countries are mainly (ex)Protestant and, with the exception of 
Finland, the minority governments occur there rather frequently (Raunio 2005).  
This naturally begs the question how the Baltic countries have been affected by the Eu-
ropeanization process and whether their de-parlaimentirization has occurred. Based on the 
available research, we can draw a couple of expectations about the Europeanization level in 
the Baltic States and its character. 
First, the Baltic parliaments are rather young and inexperienced as compared with their 
Nordic counterparts. This alone would make Baltic parliaments rather more vulnerable to the 
Europeanization process as compared with the Nordic legislatures. Furthermore, this tendency 
is even more amplified by the high degrees of electoral volatility (Sikk 2005) and party system 
polarization (Jastramskis 2011). The degree of party system polarization is of paramount 
importance, because it hinders the consensus policies in the parliament and tends to prevent 
fruitful discussions between the position and the opposition. This indicator also signals that 
Baltic parliaments resemble “Plenaries” rather than the “Working parliaments” of the Nordic 
countries (Rasch 2004). If this is the case, one could easily expect to see that the Baltic political 
systems would be more dominated by the executive.
Based on the Raunio’s research, the same expectation can be drawn. Even though the insti-
tutional strength of the Baltic parliaments has never been analyzed and empirically tested, due 
to the features outlined above it would be logical to expect that the Baltic parliaments would 
be classified as weaker than the Nordic ones. However, empirical research on the strength of 
Baltic parliaments is strongly needed and would be most welcome.   
The Baltic populations are some of the most pro-European in the EU2, and there is no 
clear party cleavage on the European matters (at least among systemic parties), and minority 
governments are rare exceptions. All this implies that the parliamentary scrutiny in the Baltic 
States should be rather weak and poorly developed; despite their recent accession to the EU, 
the Baltic political systems should be strongly Europeanized. 
However, these countries differ substantially in their political culture (in Raunio’s terms); 
Lithuania is characterized as mostly Catholic, whereas Latvia and Estonia have mostly the 
2  Eurobarometer http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_anx_en.pdf
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Protestant background. Since political culture is regarded as one of the two most important 
determinants of strength of parliamentary scrutiny in Raunio’s research, it would be very exciting 
to look, whether there is a difference between the Baltic countries in this regard. 
Finally, the literature is silent on whether or not the choice between the parliamentary and 
semi-presidential political systems has any effect on the strength of parliamentary scrutiny 
and the Europeanization degree of national political systems. It is logical to assume that the 
character of legislative-executive interaction is influenced by the powers and status of the 
president and, since this interaction is in the heart of Europeanization research, it would be 
intriguing to find out exactly how it influences and contributes to the Europeanization process. 
SUMMARY AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The existing research has shown that the EU membership has a strong impact on the domes-
tic political systems, especially the legislative-executive relations. Generally, it means that 
parliaments are losing power and competences by delegating them to the EU where they, 
unlike the executive, do not have a direct say or influence. However, parliaments in the other 
member states have “fought-back” and developed special scrutiny measures to exercise some 
control over the government in relation to the EU affairs. Some member states (like the Nordic 
countries) have been so successful in this aspect that they have de facto compensated for the 
loss of power. In any case, whether or not this loss of power occurs, the EU definitely changes 
the manner of executive-legislative relations in all its member states. Based on the existing 
research, the Baltic countries have all the attributes to make them very prone to the processes 
of Europeanization and de-parliamentization. However, empirically grounded research is needed 
to make any conclusions on this matter. 
First, this research should provide empirically grounded insights into the overall strength of 
the Baltic parliaments and to address the question whether there is a difference in the strength 
of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian parliaments. Furthermore, it should determine how 
the EU membership has affected the executive-legislative relations in these countries. Finally, 
it should be measured whether there is a difference in the level of strength of parliamentary 
scrutiny among the Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian parliaments. Looking into this matter would 
be extremely interesting, since, according to Raunio’s model, there should be a significant diffe-
rence in the strength of parliamentary scrutiny between Lithuania and two other Baltic states. 
Finally, the empirical research on the Europeanization of the Baltic States’ legislatures 
can be used to test whether the Raunio’s model for explaining the cross-national variation in 
parliamentary scrutiny measures is applicable to “new” EU member states. 
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